



# From user's perspective


Michaela Brchnelova  
m.brchnelova@mindef.nl



# Introduction




→ variable electromagnetic radiation



→ variable particle and plasma environment

→ variable geomagnetic field




→ variable atmosphere (incl. ionosphere)

T14:29:33.342




## Defence vulnerabilities

- if it:
  - flies in space/ upper atmosphere (or needs assets that do)
  - uses/ detects radio signals
  - communicates through the ionosphere
  - requires magnetic measurements
  - is sensitive to electric currents in the grounds
  
- system response often depends on parameters we do not know exactly






# Additional relevance?



[NASA]





“Risk”




## Space weather (SW) effects risks

- when evaluating SW risks, looking at the probability alone is often not enough:

**risk = probability x cost**

- cost may be political, military, societal, financial, etc.
- the resulting risks are organisation- and platform-dependent, e.g., on the procedures in place, the protocols and the system diversity/ redundancy  
→ **up to the user to decide! But with the “probability” part, we can help**






## Reception VHF advertisements

- ~ 40 MHz advertisement originated from Israel, how to stop this?
- VHF line-of-sight (LOS) only: ionosphere normally only reflects up to ~ 30 MHz
- What causes ionospheric disturbances?
  - solar flares → none strong detected that day
  - proton storms → not in polar regions + no proton storms detected that day
  - geomagnetic storms → none strong that day/ days prior
- check ionospheric total electron content maps → no extraordinary patterns
- check ionogram data of nearby stations → strong E-layer normally not there  
→ **reception and noise due to a sporadic E-layer**




## 2002 The Battle of Takur Ghar (Afghanistan)

- plasma bubbles post-midnight might occur due to increased geomagnetic activity of  $K_p > 3$ : the battle of Takur Ghar:  $K_p = 4$ , 0300 LT March 4, 2002
- during the battle, Chinook helicopters from the QRF were called to help Navy SEAL units, landing at Takur Ghar (Afghanistan)
- in the meantime, the area became “hot”, but the helicopters never received the repeated warnings avoid the area → the Chinook crashed and seven people died



Sketch prepared by ROB/GNSS (Dr Nicolas Bergeot) with NICT/AERI – Dr Yokoyama’s model as base [http://aer.nict.go.jp/en/people/spe\\_yokoyama.html](http://aer.nict.go.jp/en/people/spe_yokoyama.html)




Credit: U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)  
[https://www.nasa.gov/mission\\_pages/cindi/five-years.html](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/cindi/five-years.html)



## Questions to be asked (and answered)

- is this **really** a problem?
  - how often does this happen?
  - which systems are affected and how much?
  - what are the consequences in operations?
- if so, is there something we can do about it?
  - operational settings adjustment?
  - better design of existing systems?
  - increasing redundancy?
  - improving awareness?
  - fast-tracking/ delaying operations?

$$\text{risk} = \text{probability} \times \text{cost}$$





## SWx vulnerability examples:

- HF radio (radar)
- UHF & VHF radio (radar)
- VLF radio
- SATCOM, GNSS
- MAD/ magnetic navigation
- power systems
- SATOPS:
  - atmosphere
  - particle environment
  - COM loss



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
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# HF radio




# How do we communicate? Why is the ionosphere important?






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


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


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



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


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


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


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
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


- HF more and more important due to anti-sat weapons and satcom jamming (Ukr)



# How do we communicate? Why is the ionosphere important?





0.1 - 0.8 nm

160 - 500 km

F/F2 layer

$f_D < f_{\text{signal}}$

50 - 90 km

D layer

$f_{\text{MIN}} \propto \rho(e)$

absorption on the path

normal:  $f_{F/F2} > f_D \rightarrow f_D < f_{\text{signal}} < f_{F/F2}$



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normal:  $f_{F/F2} > f_D \rightarrow f_D < f_{signal} < f_{F/F2}$



0.1 - 0.3

160 - 500 km

E/F2 layer

- similar extra effects in the poles due to **auroral absorption** (magnetospheric electrons) and **polar cap absorption** (SEPs)
- **post-storm depression** lowers the maximum usable frequency

$f_{MIN} \propto \rho(e)$

50 - 90 km

D layer

$f_D > f_{signal}$

normal:  $f_{F/F2} > f_D \rightarrow f_D < f_{signal} < f_{F/F2}$




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Credit: Harris



Credit: Aus Defence






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
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
## HF radio/ radar differences

- signal travels the path twice → more interference with the ionosphere!





# HF radio: K. Cornelis - HF link of Twente





## HF radio: How much of a problem is this really?

Event	Moderate events in solar maximum [h]			Moderate events in solar minimum [h]		
	0 - 10 MHz	10 - 20 MHz	20 - 30 MHz	0 - 10 MHz	10 - 20 MHz	20 - 30 MHz
SWF 1-5 dB loss	> 300	50 - 300	5 - 50	> 200	30 - 200	3 - 30
AA 1-5 dB loss	> 30		10 - 30	> 20		5 - 20
PCA 1-5 dB loss	≥ 100	> 100	50 - 100	≥ 50	> 50	10 - 50
PSD 30-50% ΔMUF	N/A	100 - 200		N/A	10 - 100	

**solar max, moderate: weeks/ year at low frequencies, days/year at high frequencies**

Event	Severe events in solar maximum [h]			Severe events in solar minimum [h]		
	0 - 10 MHz	10 - 20 MHz	20 - 30 MHz	0 - 10 MHz	10 - 20 MHz	20 - 30 MHz
SWF >5 dB loss	> 5	0 - 5	0 - 5	> 3	0 - 3	0 - 3
AA >5 dB loss	0 - 30	0 - 10	0 - 10	0 - 20	0 - 5	0 - 5
PCA >5 dB loss	≥ 50	> 50	10 - 50	≥ 20	> 20	5 - 20
PSD >50% ΔMUF	N/A	10 - 100		N/A	10 - 50	

**solar max, severe: days/ year at low frequencies, hours/year at high frequencies**



## HF radio: where does it matter?

- HF the only high-data-rate link without the need of human infrastructure
  - in polar regions: SATCOM may be easily disturbed due to scintillation & unavailability
  - the same for SATCOM-denied environments
    - interest in HF growing
- HF radars used for beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) detection (e.g., Australian Jindalee)



## HF radio: mitigation strategies

- short term:
  - change frequencies in use if possible
    - to higher during absorption events (PCA, AA, SWF)
    - to lower during post-storm depression
  - fast-track/ delay operations if HF necessary
  - monitor the status of the ionosphere and forecasts
- long term:
  - improve operator awareness
  - implement more diversity into operations & systems



# VHF & UHF radio




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



# How do we communicate? Why is the ionosphere important?





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## SWx vulnerability examples:

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Credit: Naval Technology




Credit: T. Baba



## VHF & UHF radio: statistics

- antenna must have the Sun in FOV
- SRB must happen at the right frequency
- antenna must be sensitive enough:
  - 100 sfu:
    - noise very sensitive systems
  - 1000 sfu:
    - noise for many systems
    - blackout for sensitive systems
  - 10000 sfu:
    - blackout for many systems




Frequency [GHz]	$t_{>100 \text{ sfu}}$ [h/yr]	$t_{>1000 \text{ sfu}}$ [h/yr]	$t_{>10000 \text{ sfu}}$ [h/yr]
0.245	50 - 100	0 - 10	0 - 1
0.41	10 - 50	0 - 10	0 - 1
0.61	10 - 20	0 - 3	0 - 1
1.415	0 - 20	0 - 3	0 - 1
2.695	0 - 20	0 - 3	0 - 1
4.995	0 - 20	0 - 3	0 - 1
8.8	0 - 20	0 - 3	0 - 1
15.4	0 - 20	0 - 3	0 - 1





## VHF & UHF radio: mitigation strategies

- short term:
  - change frequencies in use
    - lower chance of interference at higher
  - change the pointing of the system
  - increase transmitting power
  - monitor solar radio bursts
- long term:
  - improve operator awareness
  - implement more diversity into operations & systems






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



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- **SATCOM, GNSS: inaccuracy → unavailability**
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# GNSS: error

- especially equatorial and polar regions affected

- in strong events, mid-latitude effects also observable





# GNSS: mid-latitude effects


- especially after strong geomagnetic storms
- extra 0.5 m inaccuracy already at some Kp 6-7 events
  - weeks to > month/ year in a maximum,
  - days/ year in minimum

- > 3m inaccuracy for Kp 8+ events
  - days/ year in max.

Kp 6+ conditions

Accuracy - 95th percentile and std for VNSE  
17/05/2025 PRN123


VNSE



Normal conditions

Accuracy - 95th percentile and std for VNSE  
17/06/2025 PRN123


VNSE



Kp 9- conditions

Accuracy - 95th percentile and std for VNSE  
10/10/2024 PRN123

VNSE






# GNSS: polar effects

- doubling/ tripling of GNSS error: weeks to months/ year in max., days to weeks in min.
- error tenfold and more: days/ year in max., hours/ year in min.
- either during post-noon (mostly moderate) or midnight (more severe)
- mostly < hour

[Jacobsen & Dähnn 2014]








# GNSS: equatorial effects

- similar statistics, different mechanisms
- also usually less than an hour
- almost always within first six hours after sunset

[Jiao+ 2014]





## GNSS: where does this matter?

- systems that are:
  - require precise positioning
  - require precise time-signal
- for instance:
  - guided systems (INS decreases accuracy significantly)
  - precision navigation systems (JPALS)
  - advanced communication links (time-signal for encryption)



## GNSS: mitigation strategies

- short term:
  - monitor the state of the ionosphere and forecasting:
    - state: scintillation indices/ ROTI
    - forecasting: Kp index
- long term:
  - improve operator awareness
  - implement more diversity into operations & systems (Galileo, internal time-keeping)



# Other effects




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


# How do we communicate? Why is the ionosphere important?






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Credit: EOS.org




Credit: Getty




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- UHF & VHF radio (radar): noise → blackouts
- VLF radio: noise → fade-outs
- SATCOM, GNSS: scintillation, delay → loss of lock
- **MAD: accuracy issues → low range of detection**
- power systems
- SATOPS:
  - atmosphere
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  - COM loss



Credit: Australiandefence.com


Credit: Guo et al. 2012





## SWx vulnerability examples:

- HF radio (radar): frequency limits → fade-outs
- UHF & VHF radio (radar): noise → blackouts
- VLF radio: noise → fade-outs
- SATCOM, GNSS: scintillation, delay → loss of lock
- MAD: accuracy issues → low range of detection
- **power systems: limited loads → failures**
- SATOPS:
  - atmosphere
  - particle environment
  - COM loss



Credit: Lumen






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- MAD: accuracy issues → low range of detection
- power systems: limited loads → failures
- **SATOPS:**
  - **atmosphere: increased fuel usage → reentry**
  - **particle environment: excessive charging → failure**
  - **COM loss: OPS issues → collision risk**

Credit: ISISpace





# Other types of challenges



## Operator awareness?

- “technical failures” that later disappear
- too much extra “noise”
- some are resolved within minutes, some for hours/ days
- essential to know what these look like in different systems but:
  - operator awareness largely lacking
  - insufficient applied SWx research to know if SW-related
- need to better engage operators and improve their awareness





Credits: Lockheed Martin



## Examples of SWx vulnerabilities

- HF-radio system for long-distance comms:
  - ... but needs time-synchronisation from GPS/ GNSS
- UHF radio with several channels on a drone
  - ... with all the channels within 20 MHz from each other





## Strategic SWx challenges

- we rely on the US too much:
  - interplanetary magnetic field data at L1
  - solar magnetogram measurements
  - (near) real-time X-ray & EUV measurements
  - modelling of D-layer ionospheric absorption
  - atmospheric models (what does ESA use?) ...



Credits: NOAA

→ **need to improve the quality and exploitation of European services**



Thank you for your attention

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